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W.T. Jones 
What should American educators aim at accomplishing in the closing years of the 
twentieth century? Everybody agrees that major changes are desirable, but the 
proposal that is most widely discussed and that is being pushed by Bloom, Bennett and 
other secular theologians of a right-wing persuasion -- to resusitate "general education," 
alternatively "core curriculum," alternatively again "the liberal arts" -- would make 
matters worse, not better. It would be seriously dysfunctional in our proletaritized, 
polyglot society. 
There is nothing new about these proposals. Core curriculum is a concept that has 
been around for a long time, but none of the various core curriculums that have been 
laboriously worked out in the last 50 years has won general acceptance, or even 
survived very long in the institution that initiated it. None has reflected a consensus 
about what subjects, what courses, are canonical; each has rather been the product of a 
political struggle amongst participating departments for a share in the lucrative pool of 
students that the core curriculum generates -- a struggle that has little to do with 
educational ideals and that differs in no significant way from the bargaining and log-
rolling by which Congressmen compete for shares in the Defense Department budget 
for their own districts. That the search for a core curriculum has not been successful is 
not surprising -- educators will not be able to find a core for their curriculum if the 
culture itself lacks a core. 
Thus, pursuit of core curriculums is a blind alley. Worse, the idea of a core is 
nostalgic, retrospective and conservative. It refers back to the good old days in which, 
2 
the secular theologians casually assume, there was a generally accepted set of central 
values within which Americans lived out their daily lives. While it is certainly true 
that the great majority of the earliest settlers were British Protestants, even then there 
were deep sectarian and socio-economic differences, and the history of the United 
States is largely the history of increasing cultural diversification, which has greatly 
accelerated in recent decades. For instance, a new study of demographic trends 
projects that soon after the turn of the century, one third of the population will be 
Latino, Asian, Black, and American Indian. Is a single core curriculum -- any single 
core -- appropriate for such diversity? Is it not more likely that those who advocate 
one are King Canutes trying to stem an inevitable tide? In any case, the onus probandi 
lies on them to demonstrate, not to take for granted, that their recommendations would 
result in improvements. 
Because I am going to propose that higher education set itself a radically different 
aim, I should start by saying that I was born into the set of values -- usually described 
as "Judeo-Christian" -- which the secular theologians want to restore. I, too, feel 
nostalgic for it -- at least in its Enlightenment version. In my youth its protective 
wings sheltered my early encounters with the world. 
But years ago, when I began serious study of the history of Western philosophy, it 
became clear to me that even within this tradition there are fundamentally different 
world views, or "partings of the way," as I then called them -- Plato and Democritus, 
Stoics and Epicureans, Descartes and HUID.e, Comte and Nietzsche. On Plato's path 
answers to all the central philosophical questions -- about the nature of reality, about 
human nature, about knowledge, values and society -- were to be found. On 
Democritus' path there was a different set of answers. Travellers on the same path 
encountered the same objects and so had a good chance of agreeing about them. But 
travellers on different paths talked past one another because different objects are 
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encountered on different paths. The Comteans could talk to Comteans and Nietzcheans 
to Nietzcheans, but Comteans and Nietzcheans could only glare at one another. And 
what was true of Western philosophy -- anything but a single path! -- was, as I came 
to see, even more obviously true when one took account of other cultures as well. 
In earlier times, when the various paths were more or less isolated from each other -
- or when travellers on the ludeo-Christiam path could look down on travellers on 
other paths as lesser breeds -- core curriculum and general education were not wholly 
implausible educational projects. But in the polyglot world of the late 20th century, 
where all paths inevitably interact, the premises underlying the notion of core 
curriculum are highly impractical. The Enlightenment system, elitist and upper class as 
it is, could regain its former position in American society -- if indeed, it was ever as 
dominant as its adherents innocently, but very conveniently, believe it to have been --
only if it came to be imposed by the state. Quite apart from the fact that any such 
imposition would be inconsistent with the basic tenets of this belief system, the 
difficulties encountered by the leaders of the Soviet Union as they have sought to 
impose their own belief system on the diverse peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, 
should discourage those who hope that a generally applicable core curriculum is a 
realistic possibility, in a society like ours. 
For better or worse, then, the world of the late 20th century is characterized by 
an immense variety of belief systems that reflect the ethnic, racial and cultural 
diversity of men and women whose lives are mutually involved but who do not want to 
assimilate. And these divisions are crossed, and so further divided, by an immense 
variety of highly specialized professions and technologies, each of which generates its 
own sub-culture. Accordingly, however rnuch elderly people like myself may deplore 
the loss of status suffered by the Enlightenment world view, it is only realistic to 
recognize that attempts to reinstate it, or, alternatively, to substitute for it some other 
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claimant to "universal" status, whether Moslem, Marxist, or whatever, are dysfunctional 
and dangerous. In the late 20th century, live and let live is surely the only viable 
course. 
But if the pursuit of core curriculums is a retrograde step, it does not follow that 
higher education should continue its present aimless drift. Higher education badly 
needs a unifying purpose -- the advocates of core curriculums are right about that. It's 
just that they are wrong about what the purpose should be. The educational system 
should help students adjust to the fact of human diversity, not make adjustment more 
difficult by teaching students to believe that the world taught them in their particular 
core curriculum -- it matters not whether they are Americans brought up in the Judeo-
Christian belief system or Moslem Fundamentalism in Iran or Marxism in the Soviet 
Union -- is the one true, real world, the worlds described in other belief systems 
being, all of them, false appearances. 
The aim of higher education should be precisely the opposite -- to help students 
accept diversity and learn to accomodate to it. Diversity is inevitable because the 
human world, unlike the world of most other animals, is a world mediated by signs. 
Human experience is filtered through, mediated by, what we human beings have 
learned and remembered, by what we manage to incorporate into concepts and words. 
The human world -- the only world to which we human animals have access -- is 
diverse and various because human beings experience the world through many different 
lenses, the lenses of their different cultures and their different belief systems. 
Everyone sees the lenses that others wear; few have any idea that they too are wearing 
lenses. 
This lens metaphor is of course Wittgenstein's, and I am doing little more in this 
paper than applying Wittgenstein's insight to the problems of education in the late 20th 
century. For I am simply saying that the aim that should guide the organization of the 
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curriculum is to help every student catch at least a glimpse of his own lens. Such a 
shift in educational focus should have three important -- and benign -- results. 
First, the graduating seniors will no longer assume, what they presumably took for 
granted when they entered as freshmen, that everything is itself and not another thing. 
They will no longer believe that the world consists of an assembly -- a very large 
assembly -- of facts -- facts about the past such as the fact that the American Civil 
War began with the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter, facts about the present 
such as the fact that Ronald Reagan is currently president of the United States. Nor 
will they any longer believe that, though some facts are doubtless complex -- the 
causes of the Civil War, for instance -- complex facts can all be analyzed into simple 
facts. 
Hence their conception of what an education is will have changed and deepened. 
They will no longer believe that education consists in learning as many facts that are 
relevant to their future careers as possible and avoiding exposure to any facts that they 
think are irrelevant to their careers. They will now understand that being .well 
prepared to enter law school or medical school or find well-paying jobs as computer 
programmers or bond salesmen is not enough. To be a good lawyer, a good physician, 
a good whatever, they will see it is necessary to be continuously curious about what is 
visible through other lenses and also ready to accept that what one sees through one's 
own lens will change over time -- to accept that one's education is never completed. 
In a word, students will realize that, because they are looking at the world through the 
lens of their culture, they cannot live comfortably, securely and permanently on the 
stock of information that they have been industriously acquiring. 
Thus the first result of focussing attention on the human nature of human 
knowledge will be an emphasis on the conlplexity and incompleteness -- and hence the 
tentativeness -- of facts. The second result will be this: students will have learned 
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how to deal intelligently with uncertainty, especially cognitive uncertainty. That they 
learn this is important because most people deal with uncertainty badly, relying on 
defensive strategies. Perhaps the most widely used of these is to retreat behind the old, 
familiar lens, whatever it was, through which they grew up viewing the world. Since 
every lens assures those who wear it that it and it alone, is not a lens, this move 
amounts to suppressing -- unlearning -- all that they have learned about the nature of 
human experience and the human world. And they relapse into an attitude -- very 
dangerous in the polyglot world of the late 20th century -- of intolerance of 
difference, for they assume that all people save themselves alone are viewing the world 
through distorting lenses, and so comfortably conclude that those who differ from 
themselves are either knaves or fools. 
Alternatively, instead of retreating into and reaffirming the old, familiar belief 
system, people may take shelter under sonle other belief system - - often, paradoxically, 
under one diametrically opposed to their earlier system, as with those ideologically 
committed liberals of the 30's who, by the 70's were ideologically committed right-
wingers. Alternatively, again, they may simply put themselves into the hands of some 
individual or institution that claims cognitive authority -- the astonishing success of the 
fundamentalist television ministry being an example of this phenomenon. 
All of these strategies are negative responses to, refusals to face, the hard truth that 
because human experience is a function of a variety of systems of signs, it is inevitably 
uncertain. They all defensively assume that uncertainty is unusual, abnormal, 
exceptional and hence that uncertain people are either just unlucky or else incompetent 
for having gotten themselves into a mess. 
The first step in learning to deal effectively with uncertainty is recognizing that it 
follows from the nature of human experience that most problems, including all 
important problems, simply don't have definitive answers, in the way that jig-saw 
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puzzles or cross-word puzzles have correct solutions. Real-life problems -- whether 
they are problems in foreign policy like negotiations with the Soviet Union over the 
control of nuclear weapons or problems in private life like that of raising a "difficult" 
child -- are less problems than they are enigmas. And with respect to enigmas, 
"muddle through" is about the best that men and women can do. They are, after all, 
even the grandest of them, men and women, seeing the world through the lens of their 
culture, not gods seeing the world as it really is. "Muddle through" means eschewing 
the vain, and therefore dangerous, hope for complete answers and definitive solutions; 
it means doing the best one can at any given time, based upon what one has learned 
from earlier decisions and doing it in such a way that one has a reasonable hope of 
doing better, because of what one does now, at some future choice-point. 
Accordingly, the second benign result of the change in aim that I recommend is 
that some graduating seniors -- more than in other educational systems -- will have 
learned not to flee from problems, but to deal with them patiently, intelligently and 
realistically. And the third result is that they will have discovered that for bold and 
courageous men and women the elusiveness of facts and the inconclusiveness of 
solutions are not to be deplored or accepted with weary resignation, that they are in 
fact opportunities to be exploited in the interest of innovation, creativity and change. 
None of the lenses of culture through which people perceive the world is rigid or 
inflexible like the set of instincts that propel ants and termites on an endlessly repeated 
round of responses to stimuli. The lenses are constantly being modified, modulated, by 
the changes -- usually small, sometimes large -- that individuals and groups initiate 
because they see a somewhat better way of saying things, a somewhat better way of 
doing things, a somewhat better way of being the limited, far from god-like creatures 
that they are and that they will remain. 
Most of these changes are small; it is only as they accumulate over time that they 
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become noticeable. A pun is an example of a small verbal innovation; it makes a tiny 
crack in the cake of linguistic custom. And -- this is the point I want to emphasize --
it is possible only because language is a cultural product. Things, as Sartre's 
Rouquentin saw, are "detached from their names"; men and women have the capacity to 
use old names in new ways -- to innovate linguistically. In so doing, they create --
quite literally -- new objects, new institutions -- in the world of human experience. 
The fact that Sartre's discovery of this freedom filled him with nausea suggests that, 
for all of his immense learning, he had been badly educated: he was a long time 
learning to accept this freedom -- to put up with it. And he never learned, I think, to 
positively welcome it, as an opportunity to be creative, even if the scope of one's 
creativity is limited, as his certainly was not, to the invention of puns. 
To be creative, whether in a big way or in the small way that is the most that most 
people can hope for, means running risks, including not only the risk of failure but, 
more painful perhaps, the risk of ridicule; it demands boldness, courage, daring. 
Nietzsche captured this idea in a powerful metaphor, itself a fine if small example of 
the creative freedom of which I have been writing. "One must have chaos in oneself to 
give birth to a dancing star." Thus, the third, and perhaps most important result of a 
shift from an educational system based on ethnocentrism to one that presupposes 
cultural relativity can be re-phrased. The students passing through this educational 
system will have learned to tolerate, even to welcome, a bit of chaos in their belief 
systems, for the sake of having a chance to create a dancing star. 
The advocates of core curriculums -- and doubtless others as well -- will challenge 
the relativistic premise from which I start. Although elsewhere I -- and others, of 
course -- have argued the case for relativism in detail, in these pages I have had to 
state it baldly, confining myself to pointing out that the relativist thesis, so far from 
being intrinsically absurd, is much more compatible with the empirical evidence of 
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diversity than is the ethnocentrism of the supporters of core curriculums. Hence I hope 
that at least some educators will suspend judgment and be willing to adopt it as a 
tentative, working hypothesis -- which is the most any relativist can consistently claim 
for any thesis -- and test the proposition that a curriculum based on the relativistic 
premise would produce more graduates who are intellectually and morally mature than 
would a curriculum based on a core curriculum. 
After all, the notion that students can acquire the attitudes that are appropriate for 
inhabitants of this late 20th century world is not Utopian. Clearly, some students now 
passing through the American system of higher education do learn to accept, and even 
enjoy, diversity and uncertainty. But such learning as does occur is now only the result 
of the happy coincidence of individual students and individual teachers, not of 
planning by the institutions themselves. 
For at present educational institutions are structured, whether intentionally or not, 
in ways that inhibit this kind of learning. Courses, lectures, syllabi, and textbooks all 
tend to protect students from exposure to diversity of opinion. So far as they learn 
anything at all, they learn to see the world through the lenses, whatever they happen to 
be, of their teachers. This naturally flatters the egos of teachers, which is one of the 
chief reasons why the system persists, but it deprives students of an essential 
component in their education -- discovery of the contextual nature of human 
knowledge. No wonder, then, that few students ever come to understand the nature of, 
and the limitations on, our human contact with the world. 
Given the sterile and bureaucratic nature of the educational system there is little 
chance of the whole system suddenly reforming itself along the lines suggested here --
to hope for that would be Utopian indeed! But over time change is possible. Very 
great changes have occurred in the past -- the introduction of the elective system, for 
instance -- because some educators had the courage to try something new and because 
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the less courageous saw that the new system, being responsive to a real cultural need, 
worked better than the old. 
Here and there in the interstices of the educational system, as I have already said, 
there are teachers who understand how the lens of culture affects the human condition 
and who want their students to understand this and also to understand its implications 
for their lives and their traffic with nature and with other men and women. 
How, it may be asked, can this understanding be communicated? The answer is 
that any concentration, or major, will do, providing only that the subject be 
sufficiently "thick" -- sociology, for instance, but not shorthand; physiology, not 
physical education -- for a variety of approaches have emerged. What matters is much 
less what the major is than how it is taught. And there is no single way of teaching 
that is the right way; the ways are as many and diverse as the culture itself. 
Nevertheless, since an example may be helpful, I will give one and I will draw it from 
the teaching I know best - - my own. 
When I was teaching the history of philosophy, for instance, I always chose texts 
that I was confident Caltech students would find not only difficult but "weird," The 
Republic for instance, and at the other end of the scale, Zarathustra. And in class 
discussions I concentrated on passages that seemed to them to be utter nonsense. 
"Don't," I used to say, "write off Plato (or Nietzsche, as the case might be) as boobs; 
they were at least as bright as you are. What they say sounds nonsense to you because 
they started from assumptions that are fundamentally different from yours. Read the 
text to find out what their assumptions were, and then think about the assumptions that 
must be hidden in what is obvious to you, because what is obvious to you would be 
nonsense to them." 
Thus it isn't necessary to design a new sort of course, but only to teach any 
standard course from a different perspective, focussing attention not so much on the 
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text as on (to use a currently fashionable term) the subtext. There is of course nothing 
original about this approach; many teachers use it. But their teaching, because it occurs 
in the interstices of a system that is set in a different mold, affects only their own 
students. 
What is necessary is only a few risk-accepting educational administrators, as risk-
accepting as Eliot of Harvard and Aydelotte of Swarthmore were in their times, which 
of course were different times, who see the relation between the kind of teaching I 
have just described and the kind of education needed in this pluralistic, culturally 
diverse society. Such educators will cease to reward their faculties for spending their 
time reorganizing the curriculum or for quarelling over which books are Great Books 
and which ideas are Great Ideas, and over which disciplines are liberal and which are 
beyond the pale. Instead, they will encourage them to concentrate on that great 
liberating art by means of which students learn an attitude of tolerance -- of ironic 
distance -- toward the manifold and diverse beliefs of others and, what is even more 
difficult, toward their own beliefs as well. 
